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Exploring Impact:  
Negative Effects of Social Networks 
 
Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski 
 
 
Abstract — The sociological literature on social networks emphasizes by and large positive network effects. Negative 
effects of such networks are discussed rather rarely. This paper tackles negative effects by applying economic theory, 
particularly neoclassical theory, new institutional theory and the results from experimental economics to the concept 
of social networks. In the paper it is assumed that social networks are exclusive and since exclusiveness affects the 
allocation of resources, negative external effects may occur. The argument of the paper is that it is not only 
advantages for network members that need to be investigated but also the disadvantages for non-network members. 
The results have two implications. The first one is for economic policy, which often fosters social networking while 
ignoring their negative externalities. The second one is for network research that can benefit from a more rigorous 
application of economic theories. 
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1. Introduction 
Social networks have become a core topic among others in social sciences in the last decades. Social network 
theory was one of the sociologists’ answers to new institutionalism which emerged in economics some decades 
ago. Granovetter’s seminal work on embeddedness of social action [1] attacks economists’ views on markets 
and on hierarchies [2][3][4][5] alike [6][7]. The concepts of social embeddedness of individual action and of 
social networks have been the battle horse for New Economic Sociology since the mid 1980s [8]. Apart from 
science, these concepts have also gained considerable support on the political arena. Political organizations such 
as the EU provide incentives—mainly in the form of monetary subsidizing—fostering networking of 
individuals, e.g. entrepreneurs or researchers. Some politicians apparently expect that positive effects of social 
networks emerge also for groups other than network members. For instance, social networks may speed up the 
production and flow of knowledge and other goods in a society. Negative effects of social networks are largely 
ignored both in the sociological literature and by political actors. Yet, negative effects may emerge not only for 
network members, but also for non-network members and for societies at large. In this paper the focus is on 
such negative effects of social networks. The aim of the paper is to address this deficit and to add critical 
thoughts to the ongoing discussion on social networks, which we consider biased and in favour of positive 
network effects. 
A social network (SN) is formed by individuals connected by links. A SN can have a horizontal or vertical 
structure1, for instance between buyers and sellers in a market. A SN is not complete so that not all individuals 
in a society are members. Thus a SN is exclusive by definition. Examples are networks of entrepreneurs who 
share factor inputs ([9] for industrial districts), networks of scientists who exchange knowledge [10][11], 
networks of workers who set up a trade union, networks of consumers or sellers (e.g., [12][13][14]). A common 
feature of SN is that they influence markets: the market for consumer goods is influenced by entrepreneurs’ 
decisions to collude, the market for scientific goods is influenced by scientific networks, trade unions influence 
the labour market and organized consumer groups influence prices and quality of products. The decision to form 
and to contribute to a SN does not merely affect the well-being of those individuals who are in the network but 
also the well-being of non-network members. Effects on third parties can be positive or negative.2
                                                          
1 A SN may have the form of a star, a circle or a Y. 
 
2 Negative effects also occur for network members. The spread of a computer virus or of diseases is much faster if actors are linked than if 
they are not. Compare [23] who refers to the epidemiology literature and formalizes in a model the spread of infections in networks. See also 
[24] for a model on the spread of (mis)information in networks. 
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In economics, the terms ‘network effect’ and ‘network externality’ are often used interchangeably [15]. 
Liebowitz and Margolis [16] identify a network externality as a network effect that allows realizing additional 
gains through network participation (cf. also [15]). The presence of a network externality implies that decisions 
of certain individuals influence the well-being of others either directly or indirectly. Katz and Shapiro [17] 
coined the term network externality and referred to it mainly as positive consumption externalities (cf. 
additionally [18][19]). For instance, if many individuals decide to purchase the same telecommunication service, 
communication among these individuals is facilitated and a positive network effect occurs [20]. The term 
network externality hints at the existence of a market failure [21]. As in the communication example, network 
effects and externalities are discussed most often for the demand side of an economy but they are also prevalent 
for the supply side (cf. [15] for a recent review on empirical findings). In this paper the focus on SN is on the 
supply side. The consequence of negative effects is that (certain) non-members of SN experience losses, while 
those in the SN experience gains (cf. e.g., [22]). 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the second section traditional economic theory which does not 
deal with institutions is used. Although this theory suffers from a shortcoming when applied to real life 
situations, it serves well as a reference point of efficient allocations and also explains why individuals could 
have an incentive to set up a SN. In the third chapter SN are considered as institutions in the sense of New 
Institutional Economics. As institutions, SN compete with alternative institutions for the allocation and 
distribution of resources. Since all institutions are related to specific transaction costs, different costs emerge if 
different institutions are used as allocation mechanisms. For the analysis the focus is on the transaction cost 
theory. In the fourth section the empirical results of network theory as found in experimental economics are 
discussed. The fifth section concludes. 
 
2. Neoclassical Economics 
 
Traditional theory implies the assumption of perfect markets and rational individuals. These assumptions help 
to identify efficient allocation of resources. In a model with a demand and a supply function a market clearing 
price and the related quantity in equilibrium are determined. Any distortions from this equilibrium lead to 
inefficient situations. Under the assumption of a perfectly competitive market, however, distortions do not 
occur. The rational individual is an optimizing agent with perfect foresight, for simplicity we may think of an 
egoist who maximizes material utility and is perfectly informed. As a starting point, this model can help us to 
illustrate negative effects of networks. 
However, few economists restrict their thoughts to the perfectly competitive model. Instead, it is reasonable 
to assume that market distortions are possible. For example, we may think of an oligopoly which constitutes a 
collusion of suppliers. Then market outcomes are inefficient as compared to the outcome in a model of perfect 
competition. Information asymmetries and information costs [25][26][27] are another reason for the emergence 
of inefficiencies and can account for a market failure. If it is assumed that asymmetries occur, then they will 
have an effect on rational individuals’ optimizing behavior. Furthermore, rational individuals have an interest in 
creating and maintaining information asymmetries because these asymmetries facilitate higher gains (e.g., quasi-
rents) than on a perfectly competitive market (cf. [28]). SN are related to information asymmetries. Since SN are 
exclusive, members of SN have different information from that of non-members. Rational individuals have an 
interest to replace or supplement the market as an allocation system through a SN because members are thus 
able to obtain individual gains. One of the consequences is that inefficiency occurs. If a SN is in place, non-
members are worse off and the situation is Pareto inferior to the market situation. For instance, if a trade union 
organizes its members successfully, this SN may induce a wage rate above a market clearing wage with a 
possible consequence of an increasing unemployment rate in the industry. The situation with the SN in place 
may also be inferior according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, i.e. if the aggregated wage gains of union members 
are insufficient to compensate the aggregate wage losses of those becoming unemployed. In this case a negative 
effect occurs for the society at large. 
Nonetheless, it is not ignored that in specific contexts setting up a SN may constitute a Pareto improvement. 
If a market does not exist and cannot be implemented (e.g., due to problems of adverse selection), then, despite 
the fact that demand and supply are positive, the equilibrium price and quantity in equilibrium are both zero. In 
this case the society is better off if exchange is initiated by a SN. This exchange is inefficient and discriminatory 
when compared with the equilibrium on a perfectly competitive market. It is, however, a Pareto improvement 
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compared to a situation with zero exchange (cf. [29][30][31]). 
To sum up this section, the argument is that the neo-classical model of perfect competition with its underlying 
assumptions cannot explain the existence of or the necessity for SN. Nevertheless, the concept of optimizing 
individuals is central for the explanation of SN. More minimalist assumptions such as information asymmetries 
make it possible to explain why SN come into existence and why SN can be stable. Firstly, they come into 
existence because they offer a way to diminish information asymmetries among members, e.g. reputation 
mechanisms [32]. Secondly, some individuals are better off if they are in the SN because they are able to extract 
quasi-rents when barriers to entry exist. A shift away from a SN—coming closer to the model of perfect 
competition—would induce losses for network members. Thus, once a SN is in place, it could be costly to 
implement a market (cf. [33]). Thirdly, the model of perfect competition provides us with a reference point of an 
ideal case. With this reference point inefficiencies induced by SN can be identified. In the next section SN are 
related to New Institutional Economics which operates with a different set of assumptions. 
 
3. New Institutional Economics 
New Institutional Economics takes into account the existence not only of information asymmetries, but also 
of bounded rationality, path dependence, and institutions, preserving the assumption of optimizing (or at least 
satisfying, cf. [34]) individuals. Institutions are norms and behavioral rules, decision making systems, 
organizations [35] or their combinations. In this sense a SN is an institution. Institutions can emerge 
spontaneously [36] or are created by individuals [37] who, for instance, set the rules of entry or rules for 
communication (e.g., as “market-makers” [38]). This applies also for a SN. For analytical purposes it is helpful 
to employ the concept of transaction costs3
In this chapter a distinction is made between the comparison of individual institutions on the one side and 
different structures of the same institution, on the other. The analysis starts with the comparison between 
individual institutions that serve the same aim. Transaction costs of these institutions can be contrasted—all 
other factors kept equal. A case in point is institutions that facilitate exchange such as markets, networks, or 
hierarchies. If transaction costs of markets are comparatively high but if a switch to an alternative institution 
with lower transaction cost is possible, then the situation is Pareto inefficient. Coase [41] explains the existence 
of the firm (as an institution) through lower transaction costs: specific processes bear lower transaction costs if a 
firm is used instead of market exchange. Another example is the institution of law. If law enforcement is not 
feasible due to high transaction costs, an alternative institution such as a SN can facilitate contract enforcement 
in specific environments at comparatively lower costs [42]. Closely related are problems of asymmetric 
information on markets, which may lead to adverse selection or moral hazard. The risks of falling victim to 
problems of information asymmetries can be reduced by SN [43][44]. These examples indicate that different 
institutions lead to a different size (but also a different kind) of transaction costs. 
 from New Institutional Economics’, i.e. the costs of implementing 
and running an institution [39][40]. 
In the SN transaction costs of exchange are often reduced by eliminating anonymity. Instead of anonymous 
relations, relational contracts among network members emerge. Relational contracts regulate repeated 
interaction and individuals are not anymore anonymous (as in traditional theory) but have an identity (cf. 
[45][46]). Reputation is created through repeated interaction of SN members. Shared network identity makes the 
occurrence of a contract violation less probable to occur because a violator’s actions can be retaliated 
[42][1][47]. Consequently, a SN reduces insecurity over decisions of others because a SN limits the set of 
behavioral choices. In this sense setting up and participation in a SN is an optimizing behavior under the 
assumption of bounded rationality (cf. [48]). 
Next, negative effects are examined. A differentiation between effects for non-members and for members of 
SN is made. Since SN are exclusive, non-members cannot influence processes within the network but are 
affected by the decisions of network members. A case in point is a reallocation of given resources in such a way 
that network members receive more and non-members less of these resources. Political processes in which 
successful lobbying or rent-seeking of a SN leads to a reallocation of resources is an example at hand (cf. 
additionally [50]). Cartels and collusions on product markets provide further examples (cf. additionally [51]). 
Consequences of a reallocation can be an increase in inequality (e.g., in income or educational opportunities). 
Another effect can be that SNs are a cause for unexploited gains from trade (cf. [47]) because the number of 
trade partners is limited to SN members with the consequence that a deadweight loss occurs4
                                                          
3 For the implementation of the concept see [41] and [49]. 
. 
4 For an evaluation of the net effects of SN the Kaldor-Hicks criterion could be applied. 
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Apart from that, members can also be exposed to negative effects. Business networks that are based on 
common religious background of its members [52] are an illustration. While the SN itself is beneficial for some 
members it is not necessarily beneficial for all members. Particularly if an exit barrier does not allow members 
to leave a SN, those members who would be better-off without the SN have to stay as members. For instance, 
business environments exist where a business loan can only be received by network members. Such a situation 
may be beneficial for some but not for all individuals in the SN (see [53]). In such cases a limitation of the 
exchange partners to SN members causes a negative effect. Another case of networks with negative effects on 
members is the creation of knowledge in science discussed by Jackson and Wolinsky [54]. The authors provide 
a model in which a researcher is working on projects with different co-authors. Links connect the researcher and 
her co-authors. If the researcher decides to build up additional links with new co-authors, her decision has a 
negative effect on the productivity of her already existing network. The model leads to the result that all 
previous co-authors are worse-off if the researcher decides to extend her network. The model hints at a set of 
specific problems: optimal network size and optimal network form. 
Finally, the question about the negative effects of SN in the long run is posed. From a game theoretic 
perspective an institution constitutes a Nash equilibrium [55], so does a SN. Since Nash equilibria can be 
inefficient, a SN can constitute such an inefficient equilibrium. Such an inefficient equilibrium can be observed 
if some members of the SN are worse-off compared to a situation without the SN, yet these members cannot exit 
the SN. In this case the SN is harmful because negative effects are not temporary but persistent over time. The 
concept of path dependence can explain the emergence of permanently inefficient SNs (cf. additionally [33]). 
Even when individuals are aware of negative SN effects, they cannot individually develop the institution to the 
better and collective action may be too costly to organize [50]. Consequently, inefficiency perpetuates. 
Since SN are causes for positive and negative effects on its members and on non-members, the question of 
net effects of SN is important. One option for measuring these effects is provided through economic 
experiments. In the next section the potential of the experimental approach is outlined. 
 
 
4. Experimental Economics 
 
The literature provides a large number of case studies of SN, e.g. in the journal of Social Networks and in 
journals related to industrial organization. A recent economic survey of empirical studies on networks is 
provided by [15]. This section briefly refers to such empirical studies conducted by using economic 
experiments5
Kosfeld [56] provides a survey of economic experiments related to networks. He distinguishes between four 
types of experiments on networks: coordination networks, cooperation networks, buyer-seller networks, and 
network formation. None of the mentioned experiments in Kosfeld’s survey explicitly investigates negative 
network effects. The empirical findings of the summarized experiments are partly in line with the predictions 
derived from economic theories, the results are partly inconclusive. In the next paragraph Kosfeld’s results are 
summed up. 
. Economic experiments permit collecting data in a controlled environment and the method is 
incentive-compatible, i.e. provides incentives for participants to exhibit their preferences. Another advantage of 
economic experiments is that they enable us to derive generalizations which go beyond specific case studies. 
First, experiments on networks in coordination games find out—by and large—that players converge to an 
efficient Nash equilibrium. Second, the results from experiments on cooperation in networks are inconclusive 
and are not always in line with theoretical predictions. Kosfeld’s explanation of the results in these experiments 
is that learning from other players does not occur. Third, buyer-seller network experiments mainly center on 
specific simulated markets. Cassar et al. [61] have recently addressed the problem of non-enforceable contracts 
in trade. In their experiments they find out that the implementation of networks leads to increased efficiency. 
This finding supports the previously mentioned institutional theory that networks as institutions can lead to 
higher efficiency if market imperfections exist. Fourth, most network formation experiments are directly or 
indirectly related either to the theoretical work of Jackson and Wolinsky [54] who introduced the concept of 
pairwise stability of links in networks, i.e. a bilateral agreement to establish a link between actors is necessary, 
or Bala and Goyal [62] who use unilateral link formation. Receiving non-rival information is the main 
advantage for individuals to connect with other individuals in these network models. Furthermore, the models 
consider the costs of being connected. The models tackle the questions of optimal network form and network 
                                                          
5 Economic experiments have become a standard methodology in investigating decisions. For overviews on the method and on the main 
researched topics compare [57][58][59][60]. 
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size. Experimental studies investigate whether the predicted Nash equilibria with respect to network form and 
size are played. The experimental results demonstrate that several aspects seem to have an influence on what is 
actually played. Risk and fairness perception are among these aspects. Mantovani et al. [63] have recently 
shown that agents in a network experiment behave ‘farsighted’ (regarding future) with respect to the stability of 
a network. 
To sum up, at present the experimental studies on networks focus primarily on whether or not a theoretically 
predicted Nash equilibrium is played and on the factors that lead to the emergence of a Nash equilibrium. None 
of the experiments focuses explicitly on network externalities, such as negative effects.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 Furubotn and Richter [64] state that a thorough analysis of collective action in cases of organized group 
interests is still missing in economic research (but see [65]). Collective action is one of the strains of economic 
research that provides the appropriate analytical tools for revealing negative network effects. The very existence 
of SN is closely related to the aim of extracting rents [66][50]. According to Olson’s [67][50] theory, the smaller 
the size of a group is, the more effective the organization of collective action among its members is, and hence 
the achievement of its goals. Thus exclusion from resources through non-membership in organized groups is a 
main feature of SN. Surprisingly, promoting SN has been adopted by international and national organizations as 
a standard policy tool. For instance, the European Union or national governments promote the emergence of 
scientific networks, of business clusters and other SN. The aim of such policies is to generate positive effects for 
members and non-members of the SN alike. However, negative effects caused by these SN are largely ignored 
(cf. [68] for SN in science). Taking these negative effects into consideration, a SN is not a cure for a problem 
but rather the cause of a disease. Indeed it prevents a society from finding more efficient institutional 
arrangements to solve social issues. Once a SN is installed, it is difficult to replace it even if it is inefficient and 
even if its inefficiency is observable and known. Self-enforcing mechanisms of SN can lead to an increase of 
transaction costs and are able to hamper economic growth and social change, a process which Olson illustrated 
in a historical example as ‘institutional sclerosis’. The conclusion is that the rather one-sided view—as often 
employed in social sciences and in policy—that SN exercise positive effects, is to be replaced by a more 
rigorous analysis which incorporates negative effects as well. 
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